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Abstract: The use of autonomous systems is becoming increasingly common in many fields. A
significant example of this is the ambition to deploy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for both
civil and military applications. In order for autonomous systems such as these to operate
effectively, they must be capable of making decisions regarding the appropriate future course of
their mission responding to changes in circumstance in as short a time as possible. The systems
will typically perform phased missions and, owing to the uncertain nature of the environments
in which the systems operate, the mission objectives may be subject to change at short notice.
The ability to evaluate the different possible mission configurations is crucial in making the
right decision about the mission tasks that should be performed in order to give the highest
possible probability of mission success.
Because binary decision diagrams (BDDs) may be quickly and accurately quantified to give
measures of the system reliability it is anticipated that they are the most appropriate analysis tools
to form the basis of a reliability-based prognostics methodology. The current paper presents a new
BDD-based approach for phasedmission analysis, which seeks to take advantage of the proven fast
analysis characteristics of the BDD and enhance it in ways that are suited to the demands of a
decision-making capability for autonomous systems. The BDD approach presented allows BDDs
representing the failure causes in the different phases of a mission to be constructed quickly by
treating component failures in different phases of the mission as separate variables. This allows
flexibility when building mission phase failure BDDs because a global variable ordering scheme is
not required. An alternative representation of component states in time intervals allows the
dependencies to be efficiently dealt with during the quantification process. Nodes in the BDD can
represent components with any number of failure modes or factors external to the system that
could affect its behaviour, such as the weather. Path simplification rules and quantification rules
are developed that allow the calculation of phase failure probabilities for this new BDD approach.
The proposed method provides a phased mission analysis technique that allows the rapid con-
struction of reliability models for phasedmissions and, with the use of BDDs, rapid quantification.
Keywords: phased mission analysis, autonomous systems, decision-making strategy, binary
decision diagrams
1 INTRODUCTION
A phased mission is one in which a system is required
to perform a number of different tasks or functions in
sequence. The periods in which each of these
successive tasks or functions takes place are known
as phases. Each phase must be completed success-
fully in order that the mission can be considered a
success. Many systems operate such phased mis-
sions, with aircraft being a prime example. When
performing an unreliability assessment for phased
mission systems, failure probabilities are calculated
for each of the individual phases and these are used*Corresponding author: Department of Aeronautical and Auto-
motive Engineering, Loughborough University, Loughborough
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to obtain the mission failure probability for the entire
mission.
Systems whose components can undergo repair
during a phased mission are known as repairable
phased mission systems, whereas systems for which
repair are not permitted during the mission are
known as non-repairable phased mission systems.
Markov techniques can deal with the dependencies
introduced when repairable phased mission systems
are analysed [1]. Fault tree techniques are suitable
when modelling non-repairable phased mission sys-
tems as the absence of repair processes facilitates the
use of such techniques that require independence
[2]. Non-repairable phased missions are considered
in the present paper.
The size and complexity of many systems means
that exact fault tree quantification is impossible
and upper bounds are often used to approximate
the failure probabilities. For this reason it is common
to convert fault trees to binary decision diagrams
(BDDs) before quantification takes place. The con-
version process requires variables, representing
fault tree basic events, to follow a specified ordering
scheme and can be time-consuming for large fault
trees. However, advantages are gained when con-
verting fault trees to BDDs, because the structure
of BDDs allows system failure quantification to be
carried out quickly and accurately, with exact solu-
tions being obtained without the need for approx-
imations [3].
The BDD approach has been applied to phased
mission analysis for non-repairable systems in refer-
ence [4]. A fault tree is constructed, taking into
account the success of previous mission phases,
which represents mission failure in each phase under
consideration, as well as the overall mission failure
probability. In order to do this a basic event trans-
formation, detailed in reference [2], is used, which
replaces all basic events in a phase fault tree by a
number of basic events that represent occurrence of
each of the basic events in each mission phase. This
results in a considerable increase in the number of
basic events to be included in the analysis. The fault
tree representing mission failure in the phase under
consideration is then converted to a BDD, which is
quantified to give an exact mission phase failure
probability. In order to construct this BDD a global
variable ordering scheme must be specified that
encapsulates all variables in the previous successful
phases as well as the phase currently considered for
mission failure. This variable ordering scheme can
have a significant effect on the size of the resultant
BDD and, as a consequence, will affect the time taken
to perform the quantification process. In reference
[5] a similar global variable ordering scheme is
required, which then allows quantification of the
overall mission failure probability, with a phase
algebra being used to deal with dependencies across
phases. Thus, in methods such as those in references
[4] and [5], if an unsuitable ordering scheme is cho-
sen, a lengthy process of BDD construction can occur
prior to quantification.
In the phased mission analysis method presented
in reference [6] a notation is introduced for compo-
nents that explicitly expresses the time periods over
which components work or fail. This is used to obtain
the mission failure conditions and calculate the mis-
sion failure probability. However, the method pre-
sented requires that minimal cut sets and minimal
path sets be obtained, using fault tree analysis (FTA),
in advance, for each phase. This requires considerable,
perhaps impractical, computational effort.
This paper takes advantage of the rapid quantifi-
cation offered by BDDs and incorporates the basic
event time period notation used in reference [6] in
order to provide the opportunity quickly to construct
BDDs for the analysis of mission phases for a system.
This is implemented in order to facilitate the use of
the decision making strategy presented in reference
[7]. A brief overview of BDDs and phased mission
analysis is followed by the BDD methodology pro-
posed to meet the challenge of providing a real-time
prognostics capability within a decision-making
strategy. It is also described how events with multiple
failure modes and external factors are incorporated
in the methodology.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Binary decision diagrams
BDDs provide an alternative approach to fault trees
to represent the failure logic of a system. BDDs can
be used for the accurate quantification [8, 9] of fault
trees, because exact solutions can be calculated
without the requirement to evaluate minimal cut sets
as an intermediate step. This method improves the
accuracy and efficiency of conventional approaches
[10] and is proving to be of considerable use in sys-
tem reliability analysis.
2.1.1 Binary decision diagram definition
A BDD is a directed acyclic graph, where all paths
through the BDD start at the root vertex and terminate
in one of two states: a 1-state (system failure) or a
0-state (system success). The BDD is composed of
terminal and non-terminal vertices, which are con-
nected by branches. Terminal vertices correspond
to the final state of the system and non-terminal ver-
tices correspond to the basic events of the fault tree.
By connection, all left branches leaving a vertex are
the 1-branches (component fails), all right branches
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are the 0-branches (component functions). The con-
struction of the BDD requires the basic events to be
ordered. In Fig. 1 an example fault tree is converted to
a BDD with the ordering A<B<C<D. The ordering
scheme employed can have a considerable effect on
the number of nodes in the BDD, particularly for large
fault trees. For this reason, it is important to select an
ordering scheme that will minimize the size of the
BDD and hence allow fast quantification.
Each path that terminates in a 1-state gives a cut
set, i.e. a combination of component failure condi-
tions where the existence of all of them will result in
system failure, when only failed states of components
are considered. For example, following the first path
in Fig. 1 gives a cut set {A, B}.
The BDD encodes the logic function of the system
failure in its disjoint form, therefore, the probability
of occurrence of the top event, QSYS, can be expressed
as the sum of the probabilities of the disjoint paths
through the BDD. Because paths through the BDD
are mutually exclusive, the probability of failure for
the system in Fig. 1, QSYS, is expressed as
QSYS ¼ qAqB þ qAð1  qBÞqCqD ð1Þ
where qi represents the probability of failure of
component i.
2.1.2 Binary decision diagram construction
A commonly used method of constructing BDDs was
developed by Rauzy [3]. This approach applies an if-
then-else (ite) technique to each of the gates in the
fault tree. If f(x) is the Boolean function for the top
event then the given ite structure ite (x, f1, f2) means
that if variable x occurs (fails) then consider f1, else
consider f2, where f1 and f2 are Boolean functions,
known as the residues of f, with x¼ 1 and x¼ 0
respectively. Therefore, in the BDD structure f1 lies
below the 1-branch of the node encoding x and f2 lies
below the 0-branch.
First of all, a variable ordering for basic events
needs to be established. Then the conversion of every
gate to the BDD is performed according to the
following rules. For gates whose inputs have already
been defined as an ite structure the rule of the con-
version process is applied, i.e. if J¼ ite(x, f1, f0) and
H¼ ite(y, g1, g0) represent two inputs to a gate of logic
type , then
JH¼ iteðx; f1H ; f0HÞ if x<y intheordering;
iteðx; f1g1; f0g0Þ if x¼y intheordering:

ð2Þ
The resulting BDD shown in Fig. 1 is an ordered BDD,
where traversing the BDD along any path from the
root vertex will encounter the nodes in the order
specified. Using this approach the variable ordering
is retained throughout the BDD because every step of
the connection is performed according to the order-
ing of the elements. Also, the method automatically
uses subnode sharing, storing each ite structure in
the memory only once and reusing calculated ite
structures further in the process.
2.2 Phased mission analysis
A phased mission defined in this paper has the fol-
lowing characteristics:
(a) a mission contains a number of consecutive and
sequential phases;
(b) a specified task has to be accomplished in each
phase and therefore there are different failure
criteria in each phase;
(c) for a mission to be successful all phases must be
completed successfully;
(d) the duration of each phase is known;
(e) all components are working before the start of
the mission;
(f) the mission is non-repairable and component
failures remain once they have occurred.
The phased mission is represented by a number
of fault trees, each of them expressing the conditions
leading to the failure of a particular phase. A method
of calculating the mission failure probability is
detailed in reference [4]. The method works by cal-
culating the probability of failure, Qi, in each of the
mission phases, i, and then adding these to give the
total mission failure probability, QMISS.
For any phase the method combines the causes of
success of previous phases with the causes of failure
for the phase being considered. The general fault tree
for this is shown in Fig. 2. As can be seen from
the diagram, in order for the mission to fail in phase i,
the failure conditions must not have been met in
any of the previous i 1 phases and then the failure
conditions for phase i must be met. Let Fj represent
the logical expression for the failure conditions
Top
G2
B D
G1
B C
A
A
1 0
1
0
B
1
C
1 0
1
0
0
D
1
0
0
root vertex
terminal vertex
non-terminal vertex
Fig. 1 Example fault tree converted to BDD
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being met in phase j and Phj represent the logical
expression for mission failure in phase j. Then
Ph1 ¼ F1
Ph2 ¼ F1  F2
..
.
Phj ¼ F1  F2  F3  . . .  Fj 1  Fj
ð3Þ
These logical expressions are represented by fault
trees such as that in Fig. 2. FTA can be used to
quantify the probability of mission failure during
mission phase i
Qi ¼ PðPhiÞ ð4Þ
The total mission failure probability is given by add-
ing these mission phase failure probabilities
QMISS ¼
Xn
i¼ 1
Qi ð5Þ
When efficiency and accuracy of the analysis is
important, the fault trees for mission failure in phase
i, representing Phi, are converted to BDDs to obtain
the probability of mission failure accurately. This
means that the logical expressions for mission failure
in phase i presented in equation (3) are effectively
converted to a BDD format, which allows fast and
efficient quantification of the mission phase failure
probabilities.
3 AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM MISSION PLANNING
METHODOLOGY
3.1 Motivation
The motivation behind this research is to develop a
strategy for the reliability analysis of phased missions
which could be used as part of a decision-making
capability for autonomous systems. In reference [7]
a decision-making strategy for autonomous systems
is presented, for which a phased mission analysis
capability is required. Because results from this
phased mission analysis capability are required
in order to make decisions as to how the phased
mission being performed should progress, it is
imperative that reliable results can be obtained in as
short a time as possible.
For example, consider an unmanned aerial vehi-
cles (UAV) that is required to perform whichever of a
number of possible missions is most likely to be
completed successfully. Consider also that it must
autonomously make a decision as to which mission
to perform in a short period of time, as the window of
opportunity for performing each of the missions is
small. A technique is required that allows the UAV
quickly to quantify the probability of success for each
of the possible missions in order to decide which
mission to perform. The chosen mission will be the
one with the highest probability of success.
The methodology presented here is aimed at
performing a phased mission analysis in order to
quantify the probability, Qi, of system failure in each
of the i mission phases of a particular mission being
performed and also the probability of failure over the
course of the entire mission, QMISS.
3.2 Overview
BDDs offer the potential to move towards the real-
time quantitative phased mission analysis demanded
by a prognostics capability in a decision-making
strategy. They allow fast quantification of the mission
phase failure probabilities, Qi, which can then be
used to calculate the total mission failure probability,
QMISS. However, considerable time can be spent
converting fault trees to BDDs, time which would
severely impact on the ability to offer real-time ana-
lysis of phased mission systems. For this reason, the
phased mission modelling methodology presented is
focussed on reducing this construction time and
having phased mission BDDs available as early as
possible in order that analysis can begin soon after a
mission configuration becomes known. Essentially,
the idea is that certain parts of the methodology are
carried out offline, before a mission configuration is
known, and other parts online, once the mission
configuration is known. The goal is to minimize the
online processes that must take place before quanti-
fication can begin and therefore move towards a real
time analysis that can be used in a decision-making
process. The idea is that in starting the quantification
sooner it may be apparent at an earlier time whether
or not the failure probability of a certain mission
configuration is acceptable.
Mission Failure in 
phase i
Failure 
conditions met 
in phase 1
Failure 
conditions met 
in phase i-1
Failure conditions 
not met in 
previous phases
Failure 
conditions met 
in phase i
Fig. 2 Fault tree for mission failure in phase i
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Figure 3 gives a representation of the steps involved
in the phased mission analysis. These are briefly
described below.
1. This step can be carried out offline, before a
mission configuration is known. For any system
to which the decision-making capability will be
applied, the failure of all possible tasks (mission
phases) that can possibly be performed must be
represented using fault trees. These are then
converted to the BDDs that will be used to
represent the failure conditions being met in
each of the mission phases, Fi. The methodology
allows these BDDs to be constructed indepen-
dently and thus time can be taken in choosing a
suitable variable ordering scheme for each BDD
that enables its size to be minimized. These
BDDs will then effectively be stored in a library
ready for later use. Since this step is carried out
offline, as much time as is available can be taken
to perform this step.
2. This is the first of the online steps, and will con-
tribute towards the time taken to perform an
analysis after a phased mission becomes known.
The mission is defined in terms of a mission
profile. This specifies the order of the tasks that
the system is to perform and the time to be taken
doing each of them. This information is applied
to the appropriate BDDs from the library,
resulting in BDDs representing Fi, which are thus
ready to be used to construct the BDDs for mis-
sion failure in the various mission phases, Phi.
The time taken to perform this step will be
minimal since it is a very simple process, as will
be described later.
3. This step is crucial in being able to begin quan-
titative analysis as quickly as possible. Rather
than having to combine the BDDs representing Fi
and follow a global variable ordering scheme for
all phase variables, where dependencies between
variables must be taken into account, in con-
structing BDDs representing Phi, there is a sim-
ple connection process that will take little time to
perform. It requires no further variable ordering
and allows rapid connection of the Fi BDDs, each
of which follows its own variable ordering
scheme that was assigned during step 1 in order
to attempt to minimize its own size.
4. Quantification of the Phi BDDs can begin. The
calculated failure probabilities can be monitored
during the quantification process for accept-
ability.
In the following sections the BDD based phased
mission methodology is described in more detail. It is
also described how a number of categories of variable
can be dealt with using the methodology.
3.3 Notation
In the proposed methodology there are three cate-
gories of variable that will be considered. Two of
these categories are components of the system and
the final one represents factors external to the system
that influence its operation during the mission.
Descriptions of each of these follow, along with the
notation that will be used for each.
3.3.1 Single failure mode variables
These variables represent components of the system
that can exist in only two states, either working or
failed. Each component has an indicator variable,
xk(ti, tj), defined as follows
xkðti; tjÞ ¼
1; if component k fails
from time ti to time tj
0; otherwise.
8<
: ð6Þ
where k¼ 1,. . .,nS and ns is the number of single
failure mode components in the system.
When considering the success state of single failure
mode variables this equivalence holds
xkðt0; tiÞ ¼ xkðti;1Þ ð7Þ
This means that when component k does not fail
from time t0 until time ti, it can fail after time ti,,
where t0 is the start time of the mission.
3.3.2 Multiple failure mode variables
These variables represent components of the system
that can exist in a working state or one of a number of
known failed states. For example, consider a valve
that can fail in an open or a closed position. Each of
1. Phase failure logic BDD 
construction, Fi
2. Mission definition
3. Connect phase BDDs to give 
mission phase BDDs, Phi
4. Quantification, giving Qi and 
QMISS
Offline:
Online:
Online:
Online:
Fig. 3 Stages of the methodology
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these components has an indicator variable defined
as
xlk ðti; tjÞ ¼
1; if component k fails
from time ti to time tj in mode l;
0; otherwise.
8<
:
ð8Þ
where k¼ 1, . . . ,nM, nM being the number of multiple
failure mode components in the system, l¼ 1, . . . ,m,
with m being the number of failure modes of com-
ponent k.
When considering multiple failure mode variables
in their success state, a similar equivalence to the one
for single failure mode variables holds
xlk ðt0; tiÞ ¼ xlkðti;1Þ ð9Þ
This means that when component k does not fail
from time t0 until time ti in its failure mode l, it can
fail in that failure mode after time ti.
3.3.3 External factor variables
These variables represent factors that would appear
in a system’s phase fault tree but would not be a part
of the system. Examples of such factors are an elec-
trical storm or rain that could affect the performance
of an aircraft. The indicator variable for these factors
is defined as
xekðti; tjÞ ¼
1; if external factor k appears
from time ti to time tj;
0; otherwise.
8<
:
ð10Þ
where k¼ 1, . . . ,nE and nE is the number of external
factors.
3.4 Methodology steps
The methodology involves a number of steps, given
that fault trees are known for all of the possible
phases that can be performed by the system. These
fault trees will represent certain tasks or functions
that the system can perform. A number of these are
configured in sequence in order to fulfil the require-
ments of a mission. Note that, as the methodology is
described here, the mission configuration for the
system is initially unknown, i.e. the ordering and
length of phases is not yet determined. The steps in
the methodology are described in the following sub-
sections. Each step will be applied to an example
system, which can perform three possible tasks,
represented by the fault trees shown in Fig. 4.
A number of basic events appear in the fault trees
for the example system: basic events A, B, C, and D
represent system components and basic event X is an
external factor that influences the behaviour of the
system. All system components, except A, are single
failure mode components, and component A can fail
in two modes, i.e. A1 and A2.
3.4.1 Convert system phase fault trees to BDDs
In order to be ready to evaluate the probability of
mission failure in as short a time as possible when the
mission configuration is decided the fault trees for
the potential mission phases, i.e. the tasks that can be
performed by the system, are converted to BDDs
using the techniques outlined earlier. This means
that the time taken to construct the BDDs does not
impinge on the time available to quantify them once
the mission configuration is decided. Each BDD is
converted using its own variable ordering scheme,
which is chosen in order to minimize, as much as
possible, the size of the BDD. The variables of the
BDDs will each fall into one of the three categories
outlined above (single or multiple mode failure or
external factor).
Performing this step on the example system
requires that a variable ordering be assigned to each
fault tree before the fault trees are converted to
BDDs. Using a simple top–down left–right traversal of
basic events in the fault trees for tasks 1, 2, and 3 sets
the variable ordering schemes, i.e. for Task1 B<
A1<X, for Task2 X<A2<C and for Task3 B<C
<D. The BDDs obtained are shown in Fig. 5. This
library of BDDs is now ready to be used in the phased
mission analysis as soon as the mission configuration
is known.
3.4.2 Mission definition and variable time
association
When the mission is defined for the system the tasks
or functions that must be performed, and the
sequence in which they should occur, are known. The
time at which each task or function will start and end
is also known and this means that the phases of the
mission have now been determined. Given this
information it is now necessary to assign the time
interval over which each of the variables contributes
to phase failure for each of the phase failure logic
A1 X
Task3
B C D
Task2
X
A2 C
Task1
B
Fig. 4 A library of fault trees for an example system
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BDDs representing Fi. Thus, each indicator variable,
as defined in equations (6), (8), and (10) will now
have an associated ti and tj. These will be determined
as follows for the three variable categories.
1. For the single failure mode and multiple failure
mode variables: ti is given by the start time for
the mission and tj by the end time for the phase
with which the variable is associated. This is
because the failure of components represented
by these variables can contribute to the failure of
the phase at any time during the period from the
start of the mission to the end of that phase.
2. For the external factor variables: ti and tj are
given by the start and end times respectively of
the phase with which the variable is associated.
This is attributable to the fact that whether or not
the external factor occurred before the phase is
not important to the failure of this phase. All that
matters is whether or not the external factor
occurs in that phase. For example, if one con-
siders rain affecting a system in a certain phase,
it will not matter if the rain occurred at an earlier
time, only if it occurs in the phase under con-
sideration. If this assumption is not true, and, for
example, rain in a phase could affect the perfor-
mance of the system in a later phase, then the
external factor must be treated as a single failure
mode variable. In this case time ti and tj are given
by the start and end times respectively of the
interval when the external factor affects the sys-
tem performance.
Consider the case where the example system will
perform a mission consisting of three phases, where
phase I is represented by Task1, phase II by Task3,
and phase III by Task2. Given this mission config-
uration, BDDs representing F1, F2, and F3 are selected
from the BDD library to be used in the subsequent
phased mission analysis. Start and end times are
assigned to each phase as shown in Table 1. Thus the
time intervals over which each of the variables will
contribute to phase failure is known and thus each
node in the BDDs selected for the mission phases is
assigned two time indices as shown in Fig. 6. The
BDDs in Fig. 6 now encode the failure logic of each
phase, taking into account the time intervals over
which the variables can contribute to phase failure.
That is, not only for the current phase but also for
preceding phases, if appropriate. For example, for the
single failure mode variables in the phase 2 BDD (F2)
the state of the components in phases 1 and 2 is taken
into account. The dependencies between related
variables in different phases are taken account of
during quantification.
3.4.3 Connection of phase failure logic BDDs
This step of the methodology involves building the
logical expressions for mission failure in phase i, Phi,
represented in equation (3) by using the appropriate
BDDs for the failure conditions being met in phase i,
Fi. When using BDDs to represent Fi and times are
associated with the variables as described above the
process of constructing BDDs, representing Fi is
relatively simple. In order to consider the success of
the mission in a certain phase the 0 and 1 terminal
nodes of the BDD are swapped. This gives a dual
BDD representing success in a phase. The AND
connection of two BDDs, performed when building
the Phi BDDs, is done by connecting all terminal 1
nodes of one BDD to the root node of the BDD to be
connected to that BDD. Although different BDDs
might contain identical variables that would nor-
mally be required to adhere to a specific ordering
scheme covering both BDDs, this is not the case with
this method. Instead, upon connection the variables
X
1
1
0
1
1 0
C
0
1
0
A2
0
1
1 0
D
0
1
0
C
0
1
0
B
0
Task3:Task2:B
1
1
0
1
1 0
X
0
1
0
A1
0
Task1:
Fig. 5 The library of BDDs representing example system
tasks
Table 1 Phase start and end times
Phase Start time End time
I t0¼ 0 t1¼ 1
II t1¼ 1 t2¼ 2
III t2¼ 2 t3¼ 3
1
01A
B01
1
1
0
1
1 0
X01
0
1
0
0
F1:
2
03A
X23
1
1
0
1
1 0
C03
0
1
0
0
F3:
1
1 0
D02
0
1
0
C02
0
1
0
B02
0
F2:
Fig. 6 Phase BDDs representing failure conditions being
met in phases 1, 2, and 3, i.e. F1, F2, and F3
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are treated as independent, with the times associated
with the variables being used to take into account
dependencies between them during quantification.
This vastly reduces time taken to construct the mis-
sion phase failure BDDs representing Phi, allowing
fast, efficient connection of the phase BDDs repre-
senting Fi.
For the example mission the BDDs representing
Phi, obtained after using the rules above to connect
the BDDs representing Fi as required to represent
previous phase success and current phase failure,
are shown in Fig. 7. These BDDs are now ready to
be quantified to obtain the mission phase failure
probabilities.
3.4.4 Phase failure quantification
In this step of the methodology the Phi BDDs
constructed by connecting the phase failure logic
BDDs, Fi, are quantified to give the mission phase
failure probabilities, as in equation (4). The quantifi-
cation process involves tracing through the BDD
from the root node along all possible paths to term-
inal 1 nodes. Traversing the 1 branch from a node
corresponds to component failure or occurrence and
traversing along the 0 branch corresponds to com-
ponent success or non-occurrence. When consider-
ing the success state related to a variable equations
(7) and (9) are used. Since all paths are disjoint, the
path probabilities are added to give the total mission
phase failure probability. A general path in the BDD
to be quantified will contain more than one instance
of a variable owing to the fact that a global variable
ordering scheme for the BDDs was not required. Each
instance represents the same component failure
in different time intervals. Taking account of these
time intervals allows dependencies between related
variables in different phases to be considered. In
order to allow quantification to take place a process
of simplifying the path failure logic must take place
as the path is traced through the BDD. This process
works by performing simple calculations with the
times associated with each variable encountered on
the path, applying simplification rules described
below. In this way, upon reaching a terminal 1 node,
every variable encountered along the specific path
leading to that node will have associated with it a
start and an end time, dependencies between vari-
ables will have been removed and quantification may
take place. The time intervals within which the vari-
ables occur (given by the associated start and end
times) govern the quantification process that occurs
for each variable on the path as the terminal 1 node is
reached. The process for the three different types of
variable is given below. Once all of the probabilities
have been calculated for the individual variables
along the path to be quantified they are multiplied
together to give the path probability.
1. Single failure mode variables
Simplification rules applied to single failure mode
variables are defined as follows
xkðti; tjÞ ¼ 0; if ti > tj ð11Þ
xkðti1; tj1Þ:xkðti2; tj2Þ ¼xkðmaxðti1; ti2Þ;
minðtj1; tj2ÞÞ ð12Þ
Applying these rules to a path leads to a variable
xk(ti, tj) which may or may not be equal to 0. If not,
then a probability for this variable is calculated as
follows
P xk ti; tj
  ¼ 1  ¼
Ztj
ti
fkðtÞdt ð13Þ
where fk(t) is the failure probability density function
for component k.
This probability can then be used in the quantifi-
cation of a path containing component k.
2. Multiple failure mode variables
Two cases are presented for multiple failure mode
variables, the first being when only one failure mode
appears on a path and the second when more than
one failure mode appears on a path.
If there is only one failure mode (out of all the
possible failure modes) considered on a path
equivalent rules to equations (11) and (12) are used
xlkðti; tjÞ ¼ 0; if ti > tj ð14Þ
1
01A
B01
1
0
0
1
0
X01 0
1 0
1
0
D02 0
1
C02
0
1
B02
0
X23
1
1
0
1
1 0
C03
0
1
0
0
2
03A
Ph3:
1
01A
B01
1
0
0
1
0
X01
0
1 0
1
1 0
D02
0
1
0
C02
0
1
0
B02
0
Ph2:
1
01A
B01
1
1
0
1
1 0
X01
0
1
0
0
Ph1:
Fig. 7 BDDs representing Ph1, Ph2, and Ph3
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xlkðti1; tj1Þ:xlkðti2; tj2Þ ¼ xlkðmaxðti1; ti2Þ;minðtj1; tj2ÞÞ
ð15Þ
If two different failure modes, l1 and l2, are considered
on a path l1 6¼ l2, equation (12) is expressed as follows
xl1k ðti1; tj1Þ:xl2k ðti2; tj2Þ ¼ 0 ð16Þ
This is attributed to the fact that a component cannot
fail in more than one failure mode. Equation (16) is
applied if tj1 6¼1 and tj2 6¼1.
If tj1 6¼1 and tj2 6¼1, xl1k ðti1; tj1Þ is expressed as
xl1k ðt0; ti1Þ, using equation (9). Then equation (16) is
expressed as given below
xl1k ðt0; ti1Þ:xl2k ðti2; tj2Þ ¼ xl2k ðti2; tj2Þ ð17Þ
This rule is explained by the fact that if a component
has failed in a particular failure mode l2 then it can-
not have failed in any other failure mode.
Applying these rules to a path containing compo-
nents with multiple failure modes yields a variable
xlkðti; tjÞwhich may or may not be equal to 0. If not,
then a probability for this variable is calculated in two
cases.
(a) Case 1: Only one of the possible failure modes for a
variable appears in the simplified path logic.
In this case the failure probability for the variable is
calculated in the same way that it was for the single
failure mode variable, i.e.
P xlk ti; tj
  ¼ 1  ¼
Ztj
ti
f lkðtÞdt ð18Þ
where fk
l is the failure probability density function for
component k in failure mode l.
(b) Case 2: More than one of the possible failure
modes for a variable appears in the path logic.
It only occurs in situations when working states of
multiple failure mode variables are considered, since
the combinations of more than one failed states of
the same variable have been removed using equation
(16). When this occurs the failure probability for the
variable is calculated as follows
P xl1k ti1;1ð Þ  . . .  xlmk tim;1ð Þ ¼ 1
 
¼ P xl1k t0; ti1ð Þ þ . . .þ xlmk t0; timð Þ ¼ 0
 
¼ 1  P xl1k t0; ti1ð Þ þ . . .þ xlmk t0; timð Þ ¼ 1
 
ð19Þ
Since xl1k ðt0; ti1Þ . . . xlmk ðt0; timÞ are mutually exclusive,
i.e. component k cannot fail in more than one failure
mode at the same time, this expression is equivalent to
1  P xl1k t0; ti1ð Þ ¼ 1
  þ . . .þ P xlmk t0; timð Þ ¼ 1  
¼ 1 
Z ti1
t0
f l1k dt þ . . .þ
Z tim
t0
f lmk dt
 	
ð20Þ
3. External factors
For variables that represent external factors no
rules for the simplification of paths need to be con-
sidered, because external factors occur indepen-
dently in each phase. Quantification takes account of
the mission phases under consideration
P xek ti; tj
  ¼ 1  ¼ qek ti; tj  ð21Þ
P xek ti; tj
  ¼ 1  ¼ 1  qek ti; tj  ð22Þ
The BDDs representing Phi for the example system
shown in Fig. 7 are traversed from the top node to
each terminal 1 vertex and the paths are identified.
For phase I there are two paths.
1. B01
2. B11A101X01
No simplification rules need be applied to these
phase 1 paths, because no components are repre-
sented by more than one variable in each path. In
addition to this, for the variable representing the
component with multiple failure modes, A101, this also
appears in isolation in the path.
For simplicity use qkl
ij
, which describes the failure
probability of component k failing in mode l in time
interval (ti, tj). For example, qA1
01
is the probability of
component A failing in its first failure mode in time
interval (t0, t1). Using this terminology and the
quantification rules above the phase I failure prob-
ability, Q1, is calculated as
Q1 ¼ qB01 þ ð1  qB01ÞqA101q
e
X01
For phase II there also are two paths, shown below on
the left. Here the simplification rule (12) is applied to
a single failure mode variable B11B02¼B12 leading to
the two simplified expressions of the path logic
shown on the right.
1. B11A101X01B02C02D02 1. B12A
1
01X01C02D02
2. B11A111B02C02D02 2. B12A
1
11C02D02
The phase II failure probability Q2 is calculated as
Q2 ¼ qB12qA101ð1  q
e
X01
ÞqC02qD02
þ qB12ð1  qA101ÞqC02qD02
Considering phase III there are 12 paths in the BDD
for Ph3, shown on the left following.
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For these paths a number of simplification rules
is applied. For single failure mode variables equation
(12) is used to simplify B11B02¼B12, B11B21¼B21,
C02C03¼C02, and C21C03¼C23. For multiple failure
mode variables equations (15), (16), and (17) are
applied to give A101A
2
03 ¼ 0 and A111A203 ¼ A101A203 ¼
A203. Therefore, paths 2, 4, and 6 are seen to be zero and
the others now have simplified path logic as shown on
the right.
The phase III failure probability, Q3, can now be
calculated in the same way that Q1 and Q2 were cal-
culated, quantifying the probability of each path by
multiplying probabilities of each component and
then summing the individual path probabilities. The
overall mission failure probability can then be cal-
culated using equation (5), i.e.
QMISS ¼ Q1 þ Q2 þ Q3:
4 CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a novel methodology for model-
ling non-repairable phased missions using BDDs.
The methodology is particularly suitable for forming
the basis of a prognostics capability in a decision-
making strategy for autonomous systems. While the
method in its current state is not capable of providing
real-time analysis, the concepts used will assist in
moving towards this goal. Implementing parts of the
method offline and parts online allows quantitative
analysis to be started as soon as possible after a
mission configuration becomes known. The quanti-
fication process involves path simplification and
quantification rules that will make up the greater part
of the time spent in the online implementation of the
methodology. The quantification process is therefore
the greatest contributor to this online implementa-
tion with the time taken increasing with the com-
plexity of the systems and number of phases in the
mission. A benefit of using this technique is that
there is little time taken in constructing the mission
BDD model online, regardless of the complexity of
the systems or number of mission phases. The
methodology involves:
(a) fault tree conversion to BDDs in advance of any
knowledge of mission configuration;
(b) a simple method, using component time require-
ments, of representing the phase of the mission in
which a task is performed, which can then be used
during quantification to account for phase vari-
able dependencies;
(c) simple connection of the BDDs representing the
logical expressions for failure conditions being
met in phase i when constructing the logical
expressions for mission failure in phase i: there is
no need for a global ordering scheme to be
applied;
(d) the potential to minimize the size of the mission
phase failure BDDs to be quantified, taking
1.B11A101X01B02C02D21X23 1. B12A
1
01X01C02D21X23
2. B11A101X01B02C02D21X23A
2
03C03 2. 
3. B11A101X01B02C21X23 3. B12A
1
01X01C21X23
4. B11A101X01B02C21X23A
2
03C03 4. 
5. B11A101X01B21X23 5. B21A
1
01X01X23
6. B11A101X01B21X23A
2
03C03 6. 
7. B11A111B02C02D21X23 7. B12A
1
11C02D21X23
8. B11A111B02C02D21X23A
2
03C03 8. B12A
2
03C02D21X23
9. B11A111B02C21X23 9. B12A
1
11C21X23
10. B11A111B02C21X23A
2
03C03 10. B12A
2
03C23X23
11. B11A111B21X23 11. B21A
1
11X23
12. B11A111B21X23A
2
03C03 12. B21A
2
03X23C03
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advantage of the fact that a global ordering scheme
need not be followed and instead that phase failure
logic BDDs may be individually minimized.
The methodology also includes rules that govern
how components with multiple failure modes and
variables that represent effects external to the system
can be incorporated into the BDD analysis.
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